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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                           Respondent 
________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A089-242-604) 
Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on January 8, 2018 
 
Before: JORDAN, ROTH, Circuit Judges and STEARNS, District Judge 
 






                                              
 The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge for the District of 
Massachusetts, sitting by designation. 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 Petitioner Hugo Alvarado-Herrera appeals the decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his request 
for cancellation of removal.  To be eligible for cancellation of removal, Alvarado-Herrera 
was required to demonstrate that he had a continuous presence in the United States for a 
ten-year period, and that over the ten-year period he did not depart “for any period in 
excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.”1  It is clear 
from the record that Alvarado-Herrera cannot demonstrate continuous presence.  To get 
around this obstacle, Alvarado-Herrera argues that (1) the IJ violated his due process 
rights by asking him leading questions that created an unreliable testimonial record, and 
(2) we should remand this case so that the government can produce records relating to 
Alvarado-Herrera’s travel on an H-2B visa, records which would definitively show how 
long Alvarado-Herrera was outside of the United States.  Neither of these arguments is 
meritorious.  We will therefore deny Alvarado-Herrera’s petition for review. 
I. 
 Alvarado-Herrera, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without 
permission in 1996.  In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal 
proceedings against him.  Alvarado-Herrera conceded removability but sought 
                                              
1 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2).   
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cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).2  Specifically, Alvarado-Herrera 
sought cancellation on the ground that his removal would result in hardship to his 
permanent-resident mother.  
 At his removal hearing, Alvarado-Herrera testified that he left the country in 2007 
from January to June (i.e., more than 90 days), and an additional five times between 2001 
and 2007, for at least a month each time (i.e., when combined with his 2007 absence, 
more than 180 days in the aggregate).  Because Alvarado’s travel outside of the country 
exceeded the limits in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, the IJ determined that Alvarado-Herrera could 
not demonstrate continuous presence.  The IJ therefore concluded that Alvarado-Herrera 
was ineligible for cancellation of removal.  
Alvarado-Herrera appealed this ruling to the BIA, arguing that the IJ 
inappropriately questioned him during the hearing, in violation of Alvarado-Herrera’s 
due process rights, and failed to consider that Alvarado-Herrera’s travel outside of the 
country was on an H-2B visa.  The BIA rejected Alvarado-Herrera’s arguments and 
affirmed.  Alvarado-Herrera now petitions for our review.3 
 
                                              
2 Section 1229b provides that the Attorney General may cancel removal of a deportable 
alien if the alien, among other things, “has been physically present in the United States 
for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such 
application.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).  The statute further provides that “[a]n alien 
shall be considered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United 
States under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) if the alien has departed from the United States 
for any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 
days.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2). 





 Alvarado-Herrera first argues that the IJ violated his due process rights by asking 
him leading questions relating to the amount of time he spent outside of the country.  To 
establish a due process violation, Alvarado-Herrera must demonstrate “(1) that he was 
prevented from reasonably presenting his case and (2) that substantial prejudice 
resulted.”4  Because Alvarado-Herrera was given sufficient opportunity to present his 
case, his due process claim fails. 
 During the hearing, the IJ solicited information from Alvarado-Herrera about his 
trips to Mexico; this type of questioning by the IJ is explicitly permitted under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.5  The IJ simply asked Alvarado-Herrera when the trips 
took place and the length of each trip.  Alvarado-Herrera’s testimony revealed that he had 
spent more time out of the country than was allowable in order to qualify for cancellation 
of removal.   
The IJ’s questioning did not prohibit Alvarado-Herrera from presenting his case.  
At no point during the questioning did Alvarado-Herrera’s attorney object to either the 
IJ’s questions or Alvarado-Herrera’s corresponding responses.  Furthermore, when the IJ 
asked Alvarado-Herrera’s attorney to conduct a direct-examination of Alvarado-Herrera 
to “rehabilitate him,” Alvarado-Herrera’s attorney responded that “from what [he had] 
                                              
4 Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
5 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (“The immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive 
evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.”) 
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just heard [the case was] over . . ..  He exceeds his time outside the United States.”6  The 
IJ therefore gave Alvarado-Herrera sufficient opportunity to present his case.  That his 
attorney declined to use the opportunity does not give rise to a due process violation. 
 Alvarado-Herrera next argues that, for at least some of the trips at issue, he 
traveled on an H-2B visa, and that the evidence from those trips, including the dates of 
travel, is in the government’s possession.  Accordingly, Alvarado-Herrera posits that the 
case should be remanded so that the government can produce any evidence relating to the 
H-2B visa and to the calculation of the various trips taken legally.    
There are two flaws with Alvarado-Herrera’s argument.  First, even if the trips 
were taken on an H-2B visa, Alvarado-Herrera offers no legal support for the proposition 
that such travel should be excluded from the continuous-presence calculation.  Instead, 
the portion of the statute discussing the breaks in continuous physical presence requires 
only that the alien “depart[] from the United States.”7   Second, the burden of establishing 
continuous presence falls on Alvarado-Herrera, not on the government.8  Alvarado-
Herrera did not present evidence of the visa and did not obtain information relating to the 
visa in the four years between the initiation of his application for cancellation of removal 
and the hearing.  Remand is therefore not warranted. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Alvarado-Herrera’s petition for review. 
                                              
6 A.R. 121. 
7 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2). 
8 See 8 U.S.C § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i) (“An alien applying for relief or protection from 
removal has the burden of proof to establish that the alien . . . satisfies the applicable 
eligibility requirements.”). 
